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Higher education has been subject to a gradual process of marketisation since the  
early 1980s. This paper explores the paradoxes inherent in a market-driven HE system
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arketisation is defined as the attempt to 
put the provision of higher education on 
a market basis, where the demand and 
supply of student education, academic research 
and other university activities are balanced through 
the price mechanism. The article begins with some 
definitions, and concludes with some thoughts 
about the best means of combining ‘market’  
and ‘non-market’ (Wolf, 1993) coordination.
The background
UK, and especially English, higher education 
has been subject to a gradual process of 
marketisation since the early 1980s. The main steps 
were the abolition of the remaining subsidy for 
overseas students’ fees in 1980; the separation  
of funding for teaching and research, and the 
introduction of selective research funding, in  
1986; the introduction of ‘top-up’ loans for student 
support in 1990; the abolition of the ‘binary line’ 
between universities and polytechnics in 1992; the 
introduction of ‘top-up’ tuition fees of £1,000 in 
1998; the changes in the rules for university title in 
2004 to enable institutions without research degree 
awarding powers to obtain a university title; and the 
introduction of ‘variable’ fees of £3,000 in 2006.
Under the present Coalition Government in 
England this process has been consolidated and 
accelerated. The maximum full-time undergraduate 
tuition fee was increased from £3,375 to £9,000 in 
2012. At the same time, the block grant to institutions 
to meet the costs of teaching has been reduced 
so that by 2015 only a small group of subjects 
receive direct subsidies. In parallel, there has been 
a progressive deregulation of funded full-time 
undergraduate places, so that in 2015 there are  
no limits on the number of students universities 
can enrol. Finally, market entry rules have been 
relaxed so that private universities and colleges 
are now offering a small but significant proportion 
of under- and postgraduate courses. There are  
now three privately owned universities: BPP University, 
Regents University, and the University of Law. Nearly 
£1bn is being spent on the education of students at 
private institutions compared with only £104m as 
recently as 2011-12 (for a detailed account of these 
changes and the background to them, see Brown 
with Carasso, 2013).
These attempts to marketise higher education 
have been accompanied by a number of other moves 
to reform higher education in a corporate direction. 
These include the remodelling of university governing 
bodies on corporate lines, and the development  
of sector-wide performance indicators (Brown, 
2012a and b). 
In parallel, there has been a progressive 
privatisation of the funding of higher education, with 
an increasing proportion of the costs being borne 
privately. By 2011, according to the Organisation  
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
only Chile and Korea amongst member countries had 
a higher share of private expenditure on institutions 
than the UK’s 69.8 per cent (this compares with 
23.2 per cent in 2006 and 11.3 per cent in 2000) 
(OECD, Education at a Glance, 2014: Table 3.2). The 
2012 reforms will of course increase the private 
share still further.
The rationale
The rationale for these reforms has three main 
components.
First, it is believed that the best use of resources 
is obtained where universities interact directly  
with students as customers, rather than with the 
Government or a Government agency acting on 
students’ behalf. The argument here is that ‘students 
know best’ and if they are empowered to act as 
consumers, institutions will either have to respond to 
their needs and preferences or lose custom. Second, 
as the system expands, its costs increase, especially  
as higher education has relatively limited scope to 
increase its efficiency. Because of real or perceived 
limits on the ability and willingness of taxpayers to 
fund a greatly enlarged system, a private contribution 
is necessary if quality is to be maintained. Third,  
many of the benefits of higher education – such  
as higher wages, more satisfying jobs, better health 
and longevity – accrue to students/graduates as 
individuals. It is therefore only fair that they should 
contribute a reasonable share of the costs (Williams, 
1995). It should incidentally be noted that 
conventional theories of the market assume a 
number of buyers and sellers: the term ‘quasi-
market’ denotes the supply of collective services on 
market lines where the state remains the principal 
direct purchaser (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993). 
M
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Value for money
Unfortunately, the arguments for marketisation, 
and the evidence underpinning those arguments,  
are rarely presented with such specificity or in such 
detail as the arguments against. If marketisation is 
considered on its own terms, and not simply as a cover 
for class or special interests and/or as an attempt to 
divert attention away from prolonged underfunding 
– both of them highly respectable arguments, but not 
considered here  –  then the case for it must be about 
increasing ‘value for money’ for stakeholders. This  
will be secured through greater competition both 
reducing costs and raising quality. And there can 
 be little doubt that some degree of competition  
does increase efficiency, responsiveness and, more 
arguably, innovation. 
But it is also clear that too much competition 
can be damaging, not only to other aspects of higher 
education (see below), but also to the central aim of 
better resource use itself. This arises mainly from the 
inevitable and unavoidable tendency, through price 
competition in what is essentially a positional market 
characterised by competition for status, for prices to 
rise to what the market will bear. The US private ‘not 
for profit’ colleges and the English private schools are 
classic instances (Brown, submitted for review). In 
both instances, the providers charge far more than  
is necessary to provide a good education, whilst the 
American private colleges create a ‘price umbrella’ 
that means that other institutions also charge far 
more than they need to, leading to wholesale price 
inflation and welfare losses (Dill, 2007). A further 
significant source of waste is increasing expenditure 
on things like marketing and branding, glitzy halls of 
residence and the like, all designed to attract students. 
In other words, some competition leads to better use 
of resources, but too much undoes the advantages  
of increased competition in the first place. This  
is the central and crucial irony of marketisation  
in higher education.
Almost all higher education institutions 
are charging the full £9,000 fee for 
all or some of their courses. So, with 
the extensive and continuing public 
financial support for both tuition and 
maintenance, isn’t what we are seeing 
really ‘business as usual’?
Academic research is a good example.
Before moving on, it may be worth emphasising 
that some important public, ‘non-market’ features 
remain. Entry to the market – access to degree 
awarding powers and university title – remains 
restricted, albeit not as much as before. Prices – full-
time tuition fees – are still controlled, and limited  
to a maximum of £9,000, at least until 2015. Loans 
for fees and maintenance are still subsidised whilst  
a significant number of students are receiving 
maintenance grants, bursaries, fee remission and 
other forms of financial support. University research 
remains heavily subsidised. It also seems highly 
probable that, given the overall future funding 
situation for higher education, student number 
controls will be re-imposed after the general election. 
Finally, price competition in full-time undergraduate 
education remains limited: almost all higher 
education institutions are charging the full £9,000  
fee for all or some of their courses. So, with the 
extensive and continuing public financial support  
for both tuition and maintenance, isn’t what we  
are seeing really ‘business as usual’?
However, there are already many areas  
of higher education that are subject to market 
disciplines (part-time and postgraduate education, 
staff remuneration especially in connection with 
research, the raising of finance, and so on). It is also 
not necessary to have a full economic market to 
generate market-like behaviour, as the respected 
US economist W.J. Baumol demonstrated many 
years ago in relation to market entry barriers in 
conventional markets. Finally, whilst it is certainly 
true that extensive private funding does not 
preclude the supply of public goods, a significantly 
higher level of private contributions is bound to 
lead to greater resistance to the levels of taxation 
needed to safeguard those wider public benefits.
Let us now turn to the main purpose of this 
article. The main ironies of the marketisation of 
higher education concern value for money; system 
effectiveness; information and consumer choice; 
quality; and the role of the state.
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In higher education the consumer 
is the joint, or even main, producer
System effectiveness
There is great difficulty in comparing the 
effectiveness of different university systems, not least 
because of the absence of any valid and reliable 
means of assessing and comparing the effectiveness 
of university teaching (see below). However it does 
appear that those systems that have a high degree  
of marketisation, and its associate, privatisation,  
are generally less effective than those that favour  
less competition and more public funding: the 
Scandinavian countries, Canada, The Netherlands 
(Gerritsen, 2008; Li et al., 2011). There may be 
parallels here with school systems and health care. 
Information and consumer choice
It is cardinal to the whole notion of an economic 
market that both producers and consumers have 
access to reliable information about price, availability 
and product quality. But in higher education the 
consumer is also joint, or even main, producer. Equally 
important, however, is the risk that, unless it is carefully 
controlled, competition leads to rationalisation  
and an actual reduction in diversity and consumer  
choice, at programme, subject and institutional levels. 
Everything for Sale? (Brown with Carasso, 2013) 
charted the demise of the specialist institutions –  
the colleges of education, the medical schools, the art 
and design colleges. We can expect to see – indeed, 
are already beginning to see – some rationalisation  
of subjects, as institutions find it increasingly difficult 
to justify continuing cross-subsidies to keep subjects 
and programmes going for which there is little evident 
market appetite. This again parallels the situation  
in the US (Blanchflower, 2014). There must also  
be some rationalisation of institutions, though how 
that will be accomplished, by whom, and with what 
resources, is far from clear.
Quality
The Coalition Government believes that market 
competition will lead to improved quality because 
providing institutions have greater incentives to offer 
better programmes to their students. However, 
marketisation necessarily turns higher education  
into an economic good, and this in itself is inimical to 
the broader liberal notion of higher education being 
about the intellectual (and moral) development of 
the individual that many in higher education still 
cling to. It leads institutions to focus on what are at 
best proxies for quality, such as student surveys, at 
the expense of things that really make for learning 
gains, such as more professional assessment. It also 
threatens academic self-regulation, which remains 
the best, as well as the cheapest, form of regulation. 
Even before the higher fee, there were a number of 
cases where academic judgements were overturned 
by managers concerned about the potential impact 
on institutional revenues or on customer reactions 
(Brown with Carasso, 2013). The Bedfordshire case, 
where it is alleged that students sponsored by Saudi 
Arabia were given greater lenience than other 
students in complying with local assessment 
regulations, is a recent instance (Matthews, 2014). 
There may be many more instances, including more 
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The role of the state
The final irony concerns the role of the state. 
Before the mid-1980s, even though nearly all the 
cost of UK higher education was borne by the 
state, there was very little official engagement with 
higher education. Although it could be draconian 
with individual institutions, the University Grants 
Committee (UGC) operated with a very high degree 
of freedom from both Whitehall and Westminster.  
So, in a slightly different way, did the corresponding 
coordinating body for the so-called ‘public sector’  
of higher education, the National Advisory Board 
(NAB). Indeed this degree of freedom was to be  
the two organisations’ undoing when the Thatcher 
(and successive governments of all parties) sought 
greater ‘responsiveness’ from the universities to 
its reform agenda. 
Although UK universities still enjoy a high degree 
of autonomy compared with many other publicly 
funded organisations, as well as with universities 
in many other countries, there can be little doubt 
that there has been a considerable increase in the 
degree of state control over UK higher education. 
This control is exercised through agencies – the 
funding councils that succeeded to the UGC and the 
NAB – that are closely monitored and controlled by 
the Government. So whereas markets elsewhere are 
seen to need less state regulation, in higher education 
they are seen to need more!
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There are five key requirements:
1. Market participation should be controlled 
through a system of institutional accreditation 
covering governance, management, finance, use 
of resources and educational quality. Peer-review 
should play a central role in this process. No provider 
that is not eligible for charitable status should be able 
to obtain degree awarding powers or university title.
2. Teaching should be funded through a 
mixture of institutional block grants and tuition 
fees, with the latter capped at 50 per cent of the 
cost. Institutional resourcing differentials should 
be controlled, with minimum and maximum  
levels of funding per student. Maintenance grants 
and national scholarships should be available for 
poorer students, with all students having access to 
subsidised loans for both tuition and maintenance.
3. Quality should be monitored by a single, 
system-wide regulatory agency accountable to 
Parliament. Institutional and departmental review 
processes supervised by the agency should ensure 
minimum standards of student learning 
achievement and academic practice. The agency 
should have the power to de-accredit any provider 
that consistently fails to meet good standards of 
governance, management or academic practice.
4. Research should continue to be subsidised 
through the funding and research councils. It should 
only be funded selectively where there is a special 
case for doing so, for example, where it is relatively 
expensive to conduct. Research quality, and links 
between research, teaching and other university 
activities, should be monitored through the 
institutional and departmental reviews.
5. There needs to be a mechanism for 
monitoring the impact of market competition and 
taking action where needed to deal with market 
failure. This should include identifying providers  
or activities in need of subsidy or support because 
of their wider contribution to the benefits of higher 
education, and promoting and facilitating institutional 
collaboration both as a means of controlling costs and 
as a way of extending educational opportunities 
(Brown, 2014).
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Conclusion
These then are some of the ironies and 
paradoxes that attend the attempt to put the supply 
of higher education on a market basis. They are 
certainly not confined to the UK (Brown, 2011) or 
indeed to higher education. But in higher education 
at least they result mainly from two constraining 
conditions.
The first, and most crucial, is the information 
problem. For many years, economists have 
acknowledged the risk of market failure owing to 
‘information asymmetry’ – the case where one  
party to an economic exchange has relevant market 
information that the other party does not. It is 
customary to think of the producer/supplier as having 
the advantage here, but there are instances where the 
boot is on the other foot, as in insurance (hence the 
‘excess’). However the problem in higher education 
is not that one party has information that the other 
party lacks, but that no one has, or can have, the 
necessary information about quality, not least 
because higher education is a ‘post-experience good’ 
(Weimer and Vining, 1992). This means that the 
information that is really needed is only available long 
after it can be of any use. William Goldman’s famous 
saying about Hollywood – ‘nobody knows anything’ 
– comes to mind here.
The second is the existence of significant 
externalities, and in particular the fact that the 
benefits of higher education are not confined to the 
individual student/graduate. The most comprehensive 
attempt so far to identify and measure these wider 
benefits (McMahon, 2009) estimates that the  
social, non-private benefits – such things as higher 
education’s contribution to democracy and human 
rights; reduced economic inequality; or lower welfare, 
medical and prison costs – amount to just over half 
the total benefits. Even the present Government has 
recognised this by maintaining some direct subsidy of 
so-called ‘strategic and vulnerable subjects’ – such as 
medicine, engineering and modern foreign languages 
– that would struggle if left entirely to market 
competition.
So what, finally, are the best ways of obtaining 
the benefits of competition without the detriments?
The problem in higher education is not that one 
party has information that the other party lacks, 
but that no one has, or can have, the necessary 
information about quality, not least because  
higher education is a ‘post-experience good’
